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Over the last decade, numerous scholars have noted the on-going expansion and 
growing economic significance of Islamic Finance (IF) across many parts of the world.1 
Although small relative to conventional finance, the value of assets held by the IF 
industry – including Islamic banks, Islamic bonds (sukuk), Islamic insurance (takaful), and 
various funds targeting investments permissible within Islamic law – was estimated at 
around $2.4 trillion globally in 2017, a level that had risen by over 40% since 2012.2 This 
growth encompasses a diverse range of countries and economic sectors, and has been 
strongly welcomed by international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, and 
UNDP, who now endorse IF as an important instrument for ameliorating global 
inequality, tackling poverty, and widening financial inclusion. 3  According to these 
institutions, IF is founded upon principles of a “just, fair, and equitable distribution of 
income and wealth during the production cycle,”4 and is thus “highly aligned with the 
spirit of the [Sustainable Development Goals]”. 5  Motivated by such claims, recent 
international initiatives have sought to mobilise Islamic finance as an alternative means 
of development financing – a tool to meet the funding shortfall for infrastructure and 
other projects. 
 
These trends sit alongside a more generalised transition towards what has been described 
as ‘finance-led’ capitalism6 – a historical moment in which financial markets have come 
to dominate most spheres of human activity, profoundly altering the behavior and 
capacities of states, firms (both financial and non-financial), households, and individuals. 
Originating in the overaccumulation crises of the 1970s, the financialisation of global 
capitalism has been identified as “the key distinguishing feature of the neoliberal era”, 
one that signals “the contrast with and even the reversal of the previous Keynesian 
period”.7 This shift was largely superintended by Euro-American financial institutions 
headquartered in core markets such as New York and London, and closely associated 
with the pronounced internationalisation of capitalist production networks through the 
latter decades of the 20th century.8 Recent years, however, have witnessed a progressive 
diversification in this architecture of global finance – notably marked by the rise of 
competing centres of accumulation outside of North America and Europe. 
 
How do we situate the growth of IF within these on-going transformations to global 
finance? Critical writing on IF has convincingly shown that Islamic financial instruments 
do not represent a substantive challenge to conventional finance or an alternative to 
mainstream development practice.9 This work has highlighted the close practical affinity 
between IF and conventional financial instruments, noting that regardless of the moral 
and ethical values supposedly underpinning IF, these religiously-backed financial 
instruments continue to promote market-based solutions to poverty and encourage 
individual subjectivities that align with broader neoliberal precepts.10 In mapping these 
processes, scholars have also tracked the ways in which major international banks and 
financial institutions have played a predominant role in shaping the design of IF 
instruments and the regulatory arrangements operative at the global level. Although these 
efforts are never a simple uncontested imposition of global financial norms on IF 
markets11, their net result has been a system that acts largely to “reproduce, to legitimize, 
and thus to further entrench current financial structures”12. 
 2 
 
Notwithstanding these important insights, what has received less frequent attention in 
the critical literature are the ways in which the expansion of the IF industry may be 
connected to the emergence of new financial actors and zones of accumulation outside 
of core Western states. It is widely accepted that the pronounced deepening and global 
interconnectivity of financial markets is closely related to the reworking of geopolitical 
power and influence13 – yet how are we to understand the place of IF within this? How is 
the ownership and control of capital structured across global IF markets, and what does 
this mean for the broader spatial geographies of international finance? Given that 
development interventions championing IF as an alternative means of financing and 
poverty alleviation are largely focused on countries in the South, what implications does 
this hold for future patterns of financial power and influence outside of the core? 
 
In what follows, I address these questions through examining the shifting contours of 
global Islamic financial circuits and the patterns of capital ownership and control found 
across these markets. I argue that the recent, rapid expansion of IF is a form of – and vector 
for – the new geographies of financial power that are emerging across the contemporary global political 
economy. Fundamentally, the global growth of IF expresses the internationalisation of 
Islamic banks and other financial groups headquartered in the six states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Oman. These Gulf-based institutions have enlarged their international 
reach and come to play a significant role in the IF sectors of numerous countries outside 
of the core Western financial markets. Such internationalisation processes have been 
buttressed by various state policies and initiatives in the Gulf, which have aimed to 
accentuate the weight of the GCC in global IF markets. Importantly, however, this 
internationalisation of Gulf-based IF and the spatial realignment of global Islamic circuits 
around various key nodes in the GCC should not be viewed as counterposed to 
conventional finance; rather, this constitutes one state-backed strategy through which the 
Gulf has attempted to refashion its position in global financial markets. Seen from this 
perspective, the expansion and geographical diffusion of Islamic finance sits in a 
mutually constitutive relationship with the Gulf’s burgeoning weight within (and new 
linkages to) the wider global economy. 
 
Methodologically, this study focuses on two key sectors of the IF industry – Islamic 
banking and sukuk – which together represent around 95% of total global IF assets.14 I 
begin first with Islamic banking, where I map the internationalisation of Gulf Islamic 
banks through a detailed investigation of the asset structures and subsidiaries of the 
nearly 170 conventional and Islamic banks in the Gulf, as well as a further 84 Islamic 
banks located in 14 countries that are deemed as strategic markets for the IF industry. 
This analysis draws upon a study of bank financial reports (in both Arabic and English), 
stock exchange data, as well as information obtained through the Bankscope database. 
Because a key goal of this study is to understand the international flows of Gulf capital 
that are explicitly characterized as Sharia-compliant, I have excluded other forms of GCC 
internationalisation (such as cross-border investments by GCC governments or 
Sovereign Wealth Funds) that are typically not associated with IF. I then turn to sukuk, 
where I utilise the publically-available sukuk prospectuses of state and corporate entities 
to trace the shifting geographies of where Islamic debt instruments are issued, as well as 
the corporate, state, and financial actors that are involved in packaging and advising on 
them. Analysis of both these sectors has been supplemented through field research in 
London, Dubai, Doha and Riyadh, where I have attended various financial industry 
events and met with individuals working in Islamic banks, as well as lawyers involved in 
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structuring sukuk. Although many of these conversations took place ‘off the record’, they 
have been invaluable to deepening my understanding and overall framing of the industry. 
 
2. Situating IF in Global Finance  
 
It is widely recognized that in the years following the 2008 global economic crash there 
has been an explosion in “studies of finance as a social relation and financialization as a 
mode of modern life” 15 across a diverse range of social science disciplines. This research 
has helped illuminate the powerful role of financial markets in intermediating and 
intervening in all aspects of our social being, imposing new financial imperatives on 
states and firms, and compelling households and individuals to rely on financial markets 
for basic needs and longer term necessities such as education, health, housing, and 
retirement. 16 Such an elevated role of finance within our daily lives has resulted in deep-
seated transformations of social and institutional behaviors – including a shift in 
individual subjectivities17, the emergence of new modes of discipline for states and other 
economic actors, as well as changes to the priorities and practices of banks18 and non-
financial corporations19.  
 
Although a significant majority of this contemporary research into finance continues to 
concentrate upon the US and European Union, there is now a growing body of work 
that analyses financial markets and processes of financialisation outside of these core 
states. This work includes studies exploring the changing position of emerging market 
banks within the global system20; comparative trajectories of financialisation in peripheral 
states21, including the growth in household and mortgage lending as a proportion of bank 
lending22; the significance of cross-border banking and international financial flows on 
forms of finance outside of the core23; and the critical role of ‘offshore’ financial zones in 
intermediating global capital flows. This broadening of geographical horizons has 
generated a more nuanced and complex picture of international finance, not least of 
which is an appreciation of the variegated paths that financial market development may 
take in different spaces across the globe.  
 
Despite this increased attention to difference and variation, however, Islamic Finance has 
tended to remain somewhat of a ‘black box’ for the broader critical political economy 
literature. With few significant exceptions that are discussed further below, IF has rarely 
been considered from a systemic perspective that emphasizes its association with 
“transformations in the character of capitalism”, and “a phase of capitalism that we 
might wish to call ‘neoliberalism,’ ‘neoliberalization,’ or in more nuanced and spatially-
sensitive terms: ‘variegated neoliberalization’”24. Instead, much of the discussion around 
IF has taken place on the terrain of Islamic scholars and industry practitioners, where the 
primary preoccupation has been the contested semantics of Islamic interpretation – a 
feature of the literature aptly described by Pitluck as one of “definitional anxiety”25. 
 
Through these partisan framings of IF, industry supporters have sought to establish that 
IF holds a higher moral and ethical stance than traditional approaches to saving and 
lending, enabling investment that can be both socially-beneficial and yet still achieve the 
religiously approved goal of making money26. Rethel describes this approach as ‘Islamic 
Finance as Socio-economic project’27, which emphasises the normative dimensions of 
risk-sharing and the avoidance of speculation, and the potential of IF to provide an 
alternative to the crisis-prone instability of conventional finance. Such perspectives 
became increasingly popular in the wake of the global crisis, when numerous studies 
purported to show that Islamic financial institutions were relatively insulated from the 
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market implosion and that a properly designed Islamic financial system could avoid the 
speculative risk inherent to modern financial markets.28 The crisis “strengthened the case 
for close adherence to Islamic financial principles”29 and even the Vatican was to praise 
Islamic banks as a more ethical form of banking30.  
 
These laudatory perspectives assert a direct and unproblematic link between the design 
of Islamic financial instruments and ethical principles derived from classical Islamic 
jurisprudence. In this regard, a number of scholars have questioned the essentialist 
assumptions that typically frame such conceptions. Islam – as with all religion – should 
not be seen as a transhistorical or homogenous set of beliefs that has remained 
unchanged since the 6th century31; its character, rather, depends heavily on the ways in 
which religious scholars (and believers themselves) interpret classical doctrine for 
modern purposes. This religious interpretation is always shaped by its current context, 
and inevitably carries with it the mark of existing social interests and power structures. 
Such interpretative flexibility is particularly pronounced in the case of Islam, where the 
absence of a centralised religious hierarchy and the presence of different schools of 
thought, has led to a situation akin to ‘structural pluralism’ in religious ideas and rulings, 
with “a multiplicity of conclusions among jurists defying easy categorization or 
analysis”32.  
 
These realities hold important implications for understanding the nature of modern 
Islamic financial instruments. Most significant to this is the determinant role of large 
global financial institutions – including Western banks and ratings agencies – that have 
shaped the regulatory guise of IF and molded its compatibility with conventional finance. 
These institutions are closely linked to a very small number of well-remunerated Shari’a 
scholars employed by firms to provide a stamp of legitimacy to IF instruments, and who 
act as “crucial gatekeepers for Islamic circuits” 33 . Such religious scholars are often 
accused of using ‘legal tricks’ (hiyal) to evade religious prohibitions, thereby structuring 
Islamic financial instruments in a manner that is substantively similar to conventional 
finance.34 Indeed, one prominent expert of Islamic law has argued that Islamic finance 
today has “almost nothing to do with economic justice, mutuality or social justice”35, and 
the religious rulings on which Islamic financial instruments are based have become “no 
more than an invention of the present, a means to validate an approach rather than any 
true reflection of the practices and norms of a previous era”.36 Historically important to 
this process, as Tripp observes, was a conceptualisation of the ‘economy’ as a distinct 
sphere and domain of human knowledge – an acceptance, in other words, of “many of 
the assumptions and imaginative reconstructions of individual and society … [that] 
underpin the ethos of the capitalist imaginary.”37  
 
Framed by this standpoint, a recent body of academic work has begun to more fully 
explore IF and its place within the wider architecture of global finance. This work 
includes studies that trace the development of Islamic mortgages in the UK and US 
during the 2000s in connection to the growing financialisation of households in these 
countries 38; the role of major international financial institutions and ratings firms in 
legitimating the spread of IF39; the ‘grafting’ of IF with conventional financial ideas and 
practices 40 ; and the institutional structures that “bridge and meld diverse legal and 
religious codes”41 and thereby enable the day-to-day operations of Islamic banks and 
sukuk issuance. While all these processes should not be understood as a unidirectional 
imposition of global capitalist norms onto emerging markets and always involve a degree 
of contestation and adaptation42 – taken together, they highlight the fact that IF is not 
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external to contemporary capitalism, but rather is one form that finance may take within a 
variegated global system.43  
 
From this perspective, scholars have challenged a further assumption that often 
underpins much of the mainstream commentary on IF: the idea that IF is growing as a 
simple causal outcome of spreading religiosity. While it may be true that religious beliefs 
can constitute a barrier to the expansion of financial markets – although, it should be 
noted, survey evidence does not necessarily affirm this link as strongly as the proponents 
of IF and ‘financial deepening’ may sometimes argue44 – it is necessary to interrogate the 
discursive role that IF plays in actually promoting neoliberal norms, reshaping forms of 
subjectivity, and helping to legitimise existing power structures. This is an insight that 
scholars working on the early history of Islamic Finance have long noted, particularly in 
regard to Saudi Arabia’s instrumentalisation of Islam in projecting its own regional 
ambitions vis-à-vis secular, Leftist and nationalist political currents in the Middle East.45 
In Kuwait, the rise of one of the world’s largest Islamic banks, Kuwait Finance House, 
was strongly encouraged by the ruling Al-Sabah family, seeking a counterweight against 
secular and Arab nationalist sentiments, and as a means to undercut rival merchant 
classes.46 And in Jordan, the emergence of Islamic banking in the late 1970s was closely 
associated with a growing political space granted to Islamic movements by the 
Hashemite monarchy, eager to shore up regime legitimacy in the wake of the 1970 civil 
war.47 Beyond the Middle East, Islamic Finance has become an important component of 
regime legitimation in Central Asia, with governments such as those of Kazakhstan 
wielding IF “to simulate and enhance political legitimacy, and convey identity to a broad 
international and domestic audience”.48 
 
More broadly, numerous authors have traced the affinities between Islamic economics 
and the rolling out of neoliberal structural adjustment measures, with the former not only 
providing religious sanction to “private property, free enterprise and the sanctity of 
contracts”49 but also encouraging the replacement of state-supported welfare with private 
philanthropy and Islamic charity. Rudnycky’s ethnographic work on Indonesia and 
Malaysia, for example, has shown how the spread of ‘spiritual economies’ is linked to the 
refashioning of individual subjectivities, “inculcating ethics of individual accountability 
that are deemed commensurable with neoliberal norms of transparency, productivity, 
and rationalization for purposes of profit”.50 Other research on Egypt, Sudan, Bahrain, 
Jordan and Turkey has similarly explored the connection between liberalisation and the 
growing weight of Islamist politics and movements.51 Such examples point to how the 
growth of IF is intimately linked to questions of power, politics, and economic change – 
a process that draws legitimacy from its avowed spiritual basis, while simultaneously 
instrumentalising this religiosity for very profane ends.  
 
From a political economy perspective, however, one significant feature of Islamic finance 
remains relatively underexplored: the ways in which the growth of contemporary IF is 
bound up with the emergence of new centres of accumulation and a reworking of 
financial power across different geographic spaces. As Bassens has observed in relation 
to Dubai and the debates around the concept of ‘world cities’, IF constitutes a “niche 
where local cultural and religious knowledge is paramount and South–South connections 
are likely to be dominant”, and thereby potentially enables the Gulf to stake a claim in 
financial circuits that lie outside of “conventional circuits, which are mostly dependent 
on knowledge in the leading world cities”.52 The deep link between internationalisation 
processes and concomitant shifts in financial power is well-established in the general 
literature on finance53 - and IF would seem to be ideally predisposed to such cross-
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border expansion due to its claims around serving a transnational Islamic community 
(ummah) – yet Bassen’s important insight has not been subject to systematic investigation 
within the critical literature on Islamic finance.  
 
These questions are particularly significant given the recent turn by IFIs and other 
multilateral organisations towards IF as a strategic development intervention for large 
swathes of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.54 In these areas, IF is perceived as one 
means of encouraging the incorporation of individuals into financial markets through the 
use of Islamic lending and saving instruments. At the same time, IF has been highlighted 
as an alternative and complementary avenue for PPP financing, with numerous 
governments now seeking to diversify their funding sources through the issuance of 
sukuk (see below). In the context of this embrace of IF by major development actors, the 
institutional weight of Islamic banks and other IF institutions is likely to be further 
enhanced (as both intermediaries between financial markets and individuals, and as 
providers of financial services to corporations and governments). The question of who 
owns and controls these institutions – and the ways in which this control is spatially 
articulated across the world market – thus bears directly on the character of financial 
power that we may see evolve over coming years in many parts of the globe. 
 
A key geographical bloc through which to approach these questions are the six Arab 
states of the GCC. In many respects, these states are now displacing Malaysia as the core 
market of Islamic finance at a global scale; yet although it is widely acknowledged that 
the Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and Bahrain – were key protagonists in the 
early formation of Islamic banks55 and the development of regulatory mechanisms for 
the global IF industry56, there has been a paucity of recent critical research examining the 
international reach of GCC IF institutions. GCC Islamic banks and other institutions are 
playing a pivotal role in the global expansion of the IF industry, and IF is explicitly 
identified in GCC national development strategies as a significant element to the region’s 
future global positioning. For all these reasons, an examination of the Gulf’s IF sector 
and its internationalisation tendencies can reveal much about the hierarchical nature of 
the global IF industry and its place within contemporary capitalism. 
 
3. Gulf Islamic Banks and Global Islamic Circuits 
 
The modern IF industry began in 1975 with the establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank 
(the world’s first commercial Islamic bank) and the Islamic Development Bank (a 
multilateral development institution headquartered in Saudi Arabia and operating on 
Shari’a principles). As institutional and regulatory mechanisms for the industry were 
slowly rolled out through the 1980s and 1990s, the presence of Islamic banking steadily 
expanded across South-East and South Asia, the Gulf and the wider Middle East. In the 
early 2000s, financial firms such as Dow Jones and the Financial Times launched Islamic 
stock indexes and the contours of a global sukuk market began to emerge with Malaysia’s 
first international sukuk issuance in 2002. Since that time the industry has seen sharp 
growth, with total global IF assets reaching over US$2.4 trillion in 2017, more than three 
times the market size in 2005. The biggest part of this market consists of $1.56 trillion in 
Islamic bank assets ($450 billion in 2005) and $450 billion in outstanding sukuk ($18 
billion in 2005).57  
 
Islamic banking entities now operate in more than 60 countries worldwide, and are 
recognised as “systematically important in Asia and the Middle East” by a recent IMF 
study. 58 Although Islamic banks in Asia (particularly Malaysia) retain a strong role in 
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regional and global markets, a clear feature of the last decade is the increasing dominance 
of GCC Islamic banks throughout all sectors of the industry. Indeed, the GCC share of 
global Islamic bank assets grew a striking 10 percentage points between 2012 and 2017, 
and now sits at 44% of the world total – far in excess of any other region. Similarly, 35% 
of global outstanding sukuk was held by the GCC in 2017 – an increase from just 29% in 
2012. When all forms of Islamic financial assets are considered (i.e. those held by banks, 
sukuk, takaful, and Islamic funds), the GCC’s global share rose from 34% to 42% 
between 2012 and 2017 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: GCC Share of Global Islamic Financial Assets 
 
Source: Author calculations, IFSB various years. 
 
The Gulf’s predominance across these various asset classes partially reflects an 
‘Islamicisation’ of banking markets in the GCC itself. Islamic banks currently represent 
around one-third of all active banks in the Gulf (55 out of 169 total banks), and have 
witnessed pronounced growth over the past decade. Although conventional banks 
remain larger than Islamic banks in all Gulf markets, Islamic institutions now rank 
number two in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, and are major players in the banking 
sectors of other GCC states.59 In 2014, Islamic-compliant banking assets in Saudi Arabia 
surpassed 50% of the country’s total banking assets for the first time in history, and the 
country’s largest bank, the National Commercial Bank, has recently announced that it 
would convert itself into an Islamic institution by 2020. Similarly, with the exception of 
Oman60, Islamic bank assets represent a significant share of total bank assets in all GCC 
states (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Size of Islamic Banking in the GCC, 2011 and 2016 
 No. of Active 
Banks (2016) 




proportion of total 




proportion of total 
bank assets (%) 
(2016) 
Saudi Arabia 20 6 43 54 
UAE 22 9 18 24 
Kuwait 38 12 43 43 
Bahrain 49 20 27 29 
Qatar 16 5 23 27 
Oman 24 3 0 3 
Source: Author calculations Bankscope database; bank annual financial statements; ITR 2017. 
 
As is the case with conventional banks, the ownership structures of Islamic banks in the 
Gulf are marked by a mix of state and private holdings, although Gulf Islamic banks tend 
to be more closely tied to large, private business conglomerates than their conventional 
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peers. 61  In addition to their banking interests, these private conglomerates are also 
disproportionally involved in construction and real estate activities, as well as service-
delivery firms and privately-operated projects that are currently underway in the Gulf 
(such as the world’s largest provider of K-12 education; Saudi Arabia’s first airport PPP; 
the Gulf’s biggest power and energy company; the top real estate developers in Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain; and the largest listed healthcare firm in the 
GCC).62 In this respect, proposed privatisation plans hold important implications for the 
future growth of Islamic finance in the Gulf – a connection stressed by numerous 
industry participants I have spoken to in the region. 
 
Within such a framework, how can we understand the internationalisation of GCC 
Islamic banks and their place in global Islamic circuits? The first issue to note is that 
compared to conventional banks located in the Gulf, Islamic banks demonstrate a much 
greater propensity to internationalise and, moreover, show a markedly different 
geographical orientation in overseas expansion than their conventional counterparts. 
Table 2 illustrates this fact through an analysis of the regional distribution of all GCC 
bank subsidiaries (held by both conventional and Islamic institutions) that are located 
outside of the Gulf. These subsidiaries encompass a wide range of activities, including 
fully-owned banks, financial holding companies, real estate firms, Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPV), and a range of other enterprises involved in industry, commerce, and 
trade. The data point towards the significant global diversification of GCC Islamic bank 
interests and their strong tendency to expand beyond their national borders. At a purely 
numerical level, the scale of internationalisation by GCC Islamic banks exceeds that of 
conventional banks: of the 414 Gulf bank subsidiaries located outside of the GCC, just 
under 60% are affiliated to Islamic banks – a markedly greater number than those 
controlled by Gulf conventional banks (and despite the fact that there are more 
conventional banks than Islamic institutions). 
 
Table 2: Geographical Distribution of GCC Bank Subsidiaries Outside the Gulf (2018) 
Location Total GCC Bank 
Subsidiaries 
No. of Islamic 
Bank 
Subsidiaries 
Share of Islamic Bank 
Subsidiaries in Total 
Bank Subsidiaries (%) 
Offshore Financial 
Centres 
144 94 65 
EU and North 
America 
76 41 54 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
109 52 48 
South Asia 28 14 50 
South East/East 
Asia 
29 17 59 
Other Africa 14 12 86 
Asia Pacific 4 4 100 
Balkans 4 4 100 
Central Asia 6 6 100 
Total 414 244 59 
Source: Author calculations from Bankscope Database. 
 
As would be expected given the structure of the global financial system, the majority 
(53%) of all GCC bank subsidiaries are located in North America/EU or in offshore 
financial centres. The number of Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries located in 
Western markets is roughly equal – in the case of offshore financial centres, however, 
Islamic banks control a much greater share of all bank subsidiaries (65%). The principal 
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reason for this higher density of Islamic bank subsidiaries in offshore jurisdictions is the 
need for Islamic banks to hold property (land or other fixed assets) in SPV as part of the 
requirements of sukuk issuance.63 These SPV are most often set up in areas such as the 
Cayman Islands, which not only offer high levels of confidentiality but also operate Trust 
structures based on English Common Law that fit well with the needs of Shar’ia 
compliance. Indeed, according to one lawyer interviewed for this article, the Cayman 
Islands has made a concerted attempt to attract GCC Islamic banks through promoting 
their use of English common law, and have also introduced language facilities that enable 
the issuance of financial documentation in both Arabic and English.64  
 
Beyond these established areas, the figures shown in Table 2 reveal the greater locational 
diversity of GCC Islamic bank subsidiaries compared with their conventional peers. Of 
the 194 Gulf bank subsidiaries located in regions outside of North America/EU and 
offshore jurisdictions, 109 (56%) are held by Islamic banks. The areas targeted in this 
internationalisation include states with long-running Islamic finance sectors (such as 
Malaysia, Sudan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia), as well as countries that have 
introduced legislation around Islamic banking very recently (e.g. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya). Strikingly, in areas beyond the 
Gulf’s immediate neighbourhood of the Middle East and North Africa, around two-
thirds of all GCC bank subsidiaries are held by Islamic banks – a very significant 
majority, which points to the outsized role of Islamic finance in forging linkages to 
countries where the Gulf’s financial presence has traditionally been much less prominent. 
 
The implications of these internationalisation patterns can be seen through a more 
detailed examination of countries that have significant and emerging Islamic finance 
sectors. Table 3 lists 14 countries that have been identified by the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) – a leading global policy institute for IF – as key existing 
geographies of Islamic finance and promising areas for its future growth. Governments 
in these countries have been enthusiastic proponents of Islamic banking and sukuk 
issuance, supported by multilateral organisations and IFIs who have targeted these states 
for recent Islamic Finance-related development interventions. For all these reasons, the 
countries listed in Table 3 provide a useful window into how the evolution of the global 
IF architecture might be connected to the projection of the GCC’s wider financial 
influence. 
 
Table 3: Global Weight of Islamic Bank Assets 
 Islamic Bank Assets as Percentage of 
Total Bank Assets 
Proportion of IB Assets held by GCC-
Related Banks 
Sudan 100% 40% 
Brunei 61.8% 100% 
Malaysia 25% 9% 
Bangladesh 20% 35% 
Djibouti 19% 100% 
Jordan 16% 80% 
Pakistan 13% 79% 
Egypt 9% 100% 
Indonesia 5% 30% 
Turkey 5% 90% 
Tunisia 5% 35% 
Senegal 5% 100% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.6% 100% 
Kazakhstan 1% 60% 
Source: Islamic bank assets from IFSB (2018, p. 15); Author calculations; Bankscope database 
 
The table shows both the proportion of each country’s banking sector that is deemed 
Islamic, as well as the overall weight of GCC-related banks in their Islamic banking 
sector (with GCC-related banks defined as those banks that are subsidiaries of Gulf 
 10 
Islamic banks, or with more than 20% of their share ownership held by Gulf-based 
investors). Remarkably, with the exception of Malaysia – where Islamic banks remain 
largely domestically owned – GCC-related banks control 30% or more of Islamic 
banking assets in all of the countries listed in the table. For 9 out of the 14 countries, 
GCC-related banks hold more than half of all Islamic banking assets, and five countries 
show Islamic banking sectors completely dominated by GCC-related institutions. 
Through such cross-border ownership ties, the expansion of global Islamic finance 
markets is closely coupled with the strengthening of Islamic finance inside the GCC 
itself. Indeed, at a global level, if we consider the 130 Islamic banks that are located in 
countries outside of the GCC, 40 of them are actually GCC-related, including nine out of 
the top twenty non-GCC Islamic banks in the world.65 
 
There are two aspects to this internationalisation of Gulf-based Islamic banks that 
deserve emphasis. First, such cross-border expansion provides an important route 
through which Gulf Islamic banks become more deeply enmeshed with other non-
banking productive and commercial activities at an international level. In Sudan, for 
example, the country’s major fixed line telecom and Internet provider, Cana 
Telecommunications, was privatised in 2016 and bought by the country’s largest bank, 
the Bank of Khartoum, whose largest shareholder is Dubai Islamic Bank. Likewise 
Jordan’s biggest Islamic bank (and fourth largest bank overall), the Jordan Islamic Bank 
(JIB), controls more than a dozen of Jordan’s most prominent non-financial companies 
involved in private universities, pharmaceuticals, the manufacture of steel pipes, real 
estate, technology, insurance, and chemicals.66 JIB is a subsidiary of the Saudi-controlled, 
Bahrain-based Al Baraka Banking group, and in this respect, constitutes an important 
mechanism for the expansion of Saudi capital throughout much of the Jordanian 
economy. Similar patterns are repeated in Pakistan, where the four largest Islamic banks67 
are all connected to GCC capital and hold extensive investments in textiles, oil and gas, 
cement, steel, and agriculture.  
 
Second, these internationalisation patterns are critical to consider given the growth of 
Islamic finance in new markets and geographical spaces that have previously been less 
prominent in the Gulf’s international linkages. One illustrative example of this is the case 
of Morocco, where GCC banks (both conventional and Islamic) have traditionally held 
little presence.68 Islamic banks had long been banned in Morocco due to the monarchy’s 
fear of Islamist movements, but in early 2015, the country enacted legislation permitting 
the operation of Islamic banks. One leading financial consultancy firm noted that “the 
main motive for Morocco’s opening up to Islamic finance is financial rather than 
religious” with the primary goal of “attract[ing] foreign investment and liquidity from 
regions such as the GCC that lead the Islamic finance industry”.69  Pointedly, the Qatar 
International Islamic Bank (QIIB) – Qatar’s third-largest Islamic bank – was the first to 
enter the Moroccan market, through a joint venture in which QIIB would hold 40% of 
assets.70 In late December 2017, the Saudi-owned Al Baraka Bank also opened a new 
Islamic bank in Morocco, Bank Al Tamweel wa Inma (BTI), in a joint venture with an 
existing Moroccan bank. The CEO of Al Baraka commented on the announcement that 
there were “large opportunities for the success of our bank, given Morocco's significant 
and promising development potential in the field of participation [Islamic] banks”. 71 
Morocco’s North African neighbours, Tunisia and Algeria, have similarly recently 
enacted legislation to support the growth of Islamic banking; in both cases, the existing 
Islamic sector is small but dominated by GCC Islamic banks, while Gulf conventional 
banking remains marginal.  
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The emergence of these new spaces of accumulation is not restricted to the Middle East. 
Further afield, Indonesia has made a significant orientation to Islamic finance over the 
past five years. With the world’s largest Muslim population, the country’s Islamic banking 
sector is relatively small (just over 5% of all banking assets in 2017), but has grown 
rapidly at a CAGR of 19.5% between 2011 and 2017.72 In 2015, the country’s Financial 
Services Authority adopted a major strategy that pledged to triple the market share of 
Islamic banking to 15% by 2023.73 And in September 2016, the country made a further 
important announcement that sukuk would constitute 50% of all sovereign debt issuance 
over the next decade, with Islamic finance underpinning government funding of 
infrastructure, education and agriculture projects. If this projected growth of Islamic 
finance continues as planned, GCC Islamic banks will likely be major beneficiaries – they 
currently control just under 30% of all Indonesia’s Islamic banking assets, including the 
country’s second largest Islamic bank. Moreover, as we shall see below, the GCC has 
become pivotal to Indonesia’s issuance of sukuk. 
 
This geographical orientation of Islamic bank internationalisation aligns considerably 
with a concurrent tilt in the Gulf’s political and economic linkages, in which the Gulf 
seeks to project itself as a key bridge between the East and other emerging markets. 
Along these lines, the leading GCC Islamic banks explicitly identify the prospective 
growth of these markets as pivotal to their future internationalisation strategies. As 
Dubai Islamic Bank puts it in a recent annual statement (2017):  
 
“We continue to expand out international business primarily focusing on 
our own triangle formation with Far East Asia, South Asia and East Africa 
… the geographies of Pakistan, Indonesia and Kenya today remain the 
focus point with future plans to expand further in the East African belt. As 
you will notice, these moves have been strategically crafted to allow the 
bank to capture the growing trade flows from Far east to South East Asia 
and the Sub-Continent connecting to Africa with Dubai as the hub”74 
 
Such trends occur alongside a raft of new legislation aimed at encouraging the growth of 
Islamic banking in West and East Africa, Central Asia, Russia, and even South America – 
where Suriname became the first country on the continent with an Islamic bank 
following the conversion of a conventional commercial bank to Sharia’ compliance in 
2017. 75 Of course in all these areas, Islamic banking is still in a nascent stage and its 
ultimate success remains uncertain. But any future growth of this industry – an aspiration 
fully supported by key regional and international economic actors – will likely see new 
relationships materialise with Gulf IF institutions. Islamic finance, in other words, acts as 
a substrate for the wider expansion of Gulf capitalism – a vehicle through which the 
Gulf’s influence is reaching geographical spaces from which it has hitherto been largely 
absent. 
 
4. Sukuk and the GCC 
 
Such geographical expansion and diversification of the IF industry not only opens up 
new markets for GCC Islamic banks in lending and deposit-taking, but also strengthens 
their role in financial market intermediation at the global scale. An important illustration 
of this is the issuance and arrangement of global sukuk. These debt instruments come in 
a multiplicity of forms, and can be issued by governments (sovereign sukuk) or corporate 
entities. They differ from conventional bonds in that the certificates purchased by 
lenders represent a proportionate ownership in underlying assets or other activities that 
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generate a cash flow.76 In recent years there has been an unprecedented global expansion 
in the use of these funding instruments – indeed, between 2014 and 2017, the value of 
sukuk offered internationally exceeded the total amount issued since the beginning of 
sukuk markets in 2002.77 
 
To a large degree, sovereign issuance from the Gulf has underpinned this exceptional 
growth. As oil prices began to decline in mid-2014, GCC governments sought to meet 
their funding requirements through offering both conventional bonds and sukuk. 
Between 2015 and 2017, the value of GCC sukuk issuance increased by over 160%78, and 
in 2017, 46% of all sukuk issued globally came from the GCC.79 A major milestone 
occurred in April 2017, with a US$9 billion sovereign sukuk from Saudi Arabia – the 
largest dollar-denominated international sukuk in history.80 This was followed by Saudi 
Arabia’s issuance of Islamic bonds on the domestic market in late July 2017 (worth $4.5 
billion), after a new government plan to regularly issue domestic sukuk was announced in 
mid-2017. In May 2017, Oman also debuted its first ever sukuk, a US$2bn seven-year 
issuance that was oversubscribed nearly three times and formed an important part of the 
country’s strategic turn towards Islamic finance. Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain have also 
all been active sukuk issuers over the past five years; only Kuwait has yet to tap the 
sovereign sukuk market, largely due to a constitutional restriction on offering 
government property as collateral (see below) – appropriate sukuk legislation, however, is 
currently under discussion in the country.81  
 
This recent GCC sukuk issuance has played an essential role in reinforcing the growth of 
Islamic banking in the Gulf. Most significantly, GCC sukuk have helped strengthen the 
asset base of GCC Islamic banks because, due to a lack of religiously appropriate 
investment options, Islamic banks tend to hold more low-yield cash on their balance 
sheets in comparison to conventional banks.82 With higher-yield sukuk now increasingly 
available, Islamic debt issuance acts to diversify the investment options of these banks.83 
Greater quantities of sovereign sukuk also help to create a benchmark for the issuance of 
corporate sukuk, and over the past five years there has been a considerable increase in 
the number of Gulf corporate entities offering such debt.84 Islamic banks themselves 
have also been prolific issuers of sukuk, in part to meet new Tier I capital requirements 
under Basel III.85  
 
Outside of the Gulf, numerous other countries have entered the sukuk market for the 
first time over recent years. These include, for example, the UK, which became the first 
Western country to issue a sovereign sukuk in 2014, a move that then-Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, described as delivering on the “commitment to [make the 
UK] the western hub of Islamic finance and … part of our long term economic plan to 
make Britain the undisputed centre of the global financial system”.86 Luxemburg, South 
Africa, and Hong Kong followed soon after with their own debut sovereign sukuk. 
Outside of these established financial centres, the Ivory Coast, Togo, Nigeria, Senegal, 
and Jordan began issuing sovereign sukuk for the first time from 2014 onwards. And in 
2018, governments in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria all announced their preparations for 
debut sukuk issuance. 
 
Such geographical growth in sukuk issuance has further accentuated the GCC’s centrality 
within global Islamic debt markets; most directly, by providing a significant source of 
revenue for GCC Islamic banks, which have acted as advisors and arrangers for many 
offerings happening outside the Gulf. In this sense, the internationalisation patterns 
analysed in the preceding section help to facilitate the weight of Gulf Islamic institutions 
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in global financial intermediation. Revealingly, of all the non-GCC sukuk issued globally 
between 2016 and February 2018, just under half (47%) have involved GCC banks as 
arrangers and advisors.87 The fees and commissions earned through these activities have 
contributed significantly to the recent growth in Gulf Islamic banking. Indeed, Dubai 
Islamic Bank, one of the most active advisors to sukuk on the international level, reports 
that its corporate banking segment – responsible for assisting governments and 
companies on such transactions – represented just under half (47%) of the bank’s before 
tax profit in 2017; a notable rise from the levels of 20-30% seen between 2012 and 
2014.88  
 
Moreover, accompanying the global diversification and expansion in sukuk is a shifting 
spatial geography of where issuance takes place. This is most clearly illustrated in the role 
of Dubai, where, in October 2013, a three-year plan was announced that aimed at 
making the emirate “the global capital of the Islamic economy”.89 Dubai’s attempt to 
project Islamic finance as a strategy to distinguish itself from other financial zones – 
utilizing a perceived ‘comparative advantage’ as a Muslim country with highly developed 
financial markets – appears to have been successful; in 2015, Dubai became the world’s 
largest location for sukuk listings, surpassing in that year the three other main global 
players in sukuk – Malaysia, Dublin, and London.90 Remarkably, since 2016, more than 
one-quarter of all sukuk issuance by governments and corporate entities outside of the Gulf 
have been listed in Dubai – these include the inaugural sukuk issuance of Hong Kong 
and eight sukuk from the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government is now 
the largest issuer of sukuk on NASDAQ Dubai, where it made history in February 2018 
with issuance of the world’s first sovereign ecological or ‘green’ sukuk (a move, 
moreover, that further points to how IF has become entwined with notions of 
sustainable development). By way of comparison, the second largest global exchange for 
sukuk listing, Malaysia, is much less internationalised – dominated instead with debt 
issued by the Malaysian government or firms, rather than international entities.91  
 
Dubai’s pivotal position in the issuance of non-GCC international sukuk further 
strengthens the weight of Gulf banks, which typically act as lead arrangers and advisors 
for these listings. In reference to Indonesia’s Dubai-listed sukuk, one banker notes: 
“Classically, it has been Malaysian banks that were the natural choice for Indonesia, but 
now you see Middle East banks doing those Sukuk … Malaysian banks are backing off 
and UAE banks are filling the gap”.92 The choice of Dubai as the location of sukuk 
issuance also tends to increase the proportion of emerging market sukuk held by GCC 
investors – indeed, a survey by S&P found that Middle East investors (primarily from the 
GCC) bought nearly half of all global sukuk issued in 2017.93 Taken together, all of these 
various trends illustrate how the GCC constitutes a core spatial zone linking the principal 
borrowers, lenders, and arrangers of sukuk transactions – the global growth in Islamic 
debt markets is increasingly intermediated by the GCC, a privileged position that acts to 
bolster the region’s own Islamic financial institutions. 
 
Moving forward, the future trajectories of the GCC’s position in Islamic debt markets 
will be powerfully shaped by a recent significant development in the sukuk industry: the 
strategic push by international financial institutions to integrate Islamic financing with 
wider neoliberal strategies, most particularly in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for 
infrastructure and other services. Precisely because PPPs meet (at least formally) the 
requirements of Shari’a-compliant financing – risk sharing, partnership in the project, 
and guaranteed returns – they can fit quite seamlessly into the goals of Islamic investors, 
while simultaneously allowing Islamic financial institutions to enlarge their asset base. As 
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the World Bank’s senior director of infrastructure, PPPs and guarantees has commented: 
“there is a natural fit in applying Islamic finance to infrastructure projects as it serves the 
very purpose of asset-backed redistribution of funds”.94  
 
In this respect, international financial institutions have begun to heavily promote the use 
of sukuk in project financing for PPPs. A landmark study published by the World Bank 
in December 2017 focuses precisely on this question, highlighting recent examples of 
Islamic financing for infrastructure PPPs in a range of sectors, including roads, energy, 
hospitals, seaports, and airports. The report’s logic confirms the strong affinity between 
Islamic finance and neoliberal development models, noting that there is a “huge global 
need for infrastructure [that] is giving rise to a massive deficit in infrastructure 
investment”95 and that a key solution is “to attract private capital to build and maintain 
the critical infrastructure that is essential for sustained economic development”.96 The 
problem is “particularly acute in the region where a vast majority of Muslim population 
lives” – the emerging and developing economies of Asia and Africa – and, as a result, 
different variants of sukuk provide an ideal form of financing for infrastructure PPPs.97 
The report goes to great lengths to emphasize that Islamic financing does not contradict 
conventional financing for PPPs, but rather “can provide a complementary source of 
financing” in which “Islamic finance and conventional finance … coexist seamlessly in 
the same infrastructure project, on equal footing”. Similar recent reports by other 
international organisations have also encouraged governments to look towards sukuk to 
fund renewable energy, education, and health projects – all of which can be additionally 
marketed as a form of Islamic ‘corporate social responsibility’ (another pillar of Islam).98  
 
It remains to be seen how successful these attempts will be given the complexity of some 
of these Islamic funding arrangements and their relatively untested practical 
implementation. Nonetheless, the logical thrust of the arguments linking sukuk and 
development financing – and the enthusiasm with which these arguments have been 
endorsed by major IFIs – confirms that the essential principles of Islamic finance are 
seen as being closely aligned with the core practices of contemporary neoliberalism. The 
use of sukuk can help accelerate the rollout of private sector-oriented development 
models and widen the sphere of market relations – not as a replacement for conventional 
financing, but as a complementary tool. Wielding Islamic finance in such a manner not 
only facilitates the deepening of neoliberal norms and forms of governance in areas that 
are explicitly conceived by international financial institutions as ‘Islamic’; it also sits in a 
mutually-reinforcing relationship with the strengthening of GCC Islamic financial 
markets, and the simultaneous reorienting of Gulf capitalism’s connections to a variety of 




Critical scholars of development have rightly observed that the ethical claims 
underpinning the rapid growth of Islamic financial markets since 2008 – and their strong 
promotion by NGOs and multilateral institutions as a tool “to eradicate extreme poverty 
and work toward a more equitable distribution of wealth”99 – obfuscate the substantive 
alignment of IF with the priorities of mainstream finance. While Islamic banks and 
lending instruments may differ at a technical level from their conventional counterparts, 
IF institutions ultimately seek to profit from the expansion of an initial sum of loanable 
money-capital advanced over time. In this sense, IF represents one form that finance and 
financial markets take in an always-variegated global capitalism – a set of practices that 
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claim legitimacy in the doctrinal assumptions of 6th century religious belief, but which 
ultimately encourage the broader systemic logics of 21st century financialisation. 
 
Building upon these now well-established critiques, this article has sought to move away 
from a predominantly methodologically-nationalist framing of IF to consider what the 
growth of this particular type of finance means within the contemporary hierarchies of 
the world market. If accumulation is conceived as a process inseparable from the 
expansion of capital beyond the national scale, then the IF industry – as with all capitalist 
sectors today – is inevitably marked by shifting geographies of financial power and new 
transnational ownership structures.  I have shown that a critical dimension to this for 
contemporary IF is the internationalisation of Gulf financial groups; a process that is 
closely bound up with how the GCC is located within the broader global political 
economy. This is evident in the internationalisation of GCC Islamic banks – which has 
proceeded at a much faster pace than banks from any other major geographical centre of 
IF – and has given the Gulf a powerful foothold in new markets as well as a wide variety 
of sectors that are typically considered ‘non-financial’. At the same time, the global 
expansion and geographical diversification of sukuk issuance is refashioning the Gulf’s 
relationships with other zones of the world market, a process that looks set to intensify 
given multilateral policies promoting the use of Islamic financing in development. All of 
these aspects to the global growth of the Islamic finance act to reciprocally strengthen 
GCC Islamic finance institutions and the region’s Islamic financial industry. 
 
From the standpoint of the world market, the discussion above has largely focused on 
the Gulf’s relationships to markets in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. There are, 
however, other important geographical dimensions to the global growth of Islamic 
banking and sukuk. First, as noted, the GCC Islamic financial industry is deeply 
connected to core Western financial centres such as London, Dublin, and Luxembourg 
through SPVs located in ‘offshore’ financial jurisdictions, as well as subsidiaries of GCC 
Islamic financial institutions that operate directly in these markets. London, in particular, 
is notably linked to the GCC’s IF industry – with all of the fully-Islamic banks operating 
in the City controlled by Gulf financial groups. Discussions around post-Brexit scenarios 
in the UK have explicitly highlighted Islamic finance as a key element to London’s future 
financial strategies, and a second sovereign sukuk is planned by the UK immediately after 
withdrawal from the EU. If these plans proceed as envisioned, IF will be significant in 
shaping the GCC’s future relationship with London and other core centres of global 
finance. 
 
The other highly important international dynamic linked to Islamic finance is the Gulf’s 
relation with East Asian markets. The Chinese government has recently declared that IF 
would form part of its funding arrangements for the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, and 
the crucial role of Dubai has been noted above in relation to Hong Kong’s debut sukuk 
issuance. Moreover, many of the countries that sit along both the ‘belt’ and ‘road’ 
components of China’s planned international expansion – Pakistan, Djibouti, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Egypt, Turkey, and the states of Central Asia – are precisely those 
countries highlighted in the foregoing analysis, and all have pledged to grow their IF 
sectors in coming years. The GCC already figures prominently in China’s current geo-
strategic orientation due to its hydrocarbon exports, logistics routes, and provision of 
financial services (Dubai, for example, is the regional base for all major Chinese banks 
operating across the Middle East and Africa) – but more work is needed on the place of 
IF within these relationships, and its potential role in shaping the GCC’s future linkages 
to the East.  
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In all of these ways, the development of global Islamic circuits constitutes an important 
bridge for the expansion of Gulf capitalism more broadly. Once again, this should not be 
seen in contradiction to conventional banking or standard financial practices; rather, 
Islamic finance forms a complementary pathway through which the influence of Gulf 
capital is extended across other scales. The growth of Islamic financial markets 
constitutes one element to how the global political economy is being reconfigured in the 
contemporary period. Calls to integrate IF into the toolbox of international development 
disguise the existing relations of geo-economic power that underpin the establishment 
and day-to-day functioning of these markets – thereby eliding the financial powers that 
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